On Wednesday of this week, an Israeli firm called Regulus Cyber issued a press release stating that "spoofing attacks on the Tesla GNSS (GPS) receiver could easily be carried out wirelessly and remotely."

That question necessitates a look at the merits of this specific Regulus-vs-Tesla claim—and then a broader glance into the history, technology, and possibilities of GNSS spoofing itself.

A closer look at the Regulus demo

If you read the opening paragraph of this article and thought that evil hackers took remote control of a car and made it go violently off-road, no strings attached, don't feel bad—you were almost certainly meant to.

Putting an antenna on the roof of the Model 3 allowed Regulus to use far less power than would otherwise be required, and therefore the firm could be far less worried about accidentally impacting other, unrelated GPS devices nearby.

In a human driver's case, "local sensors" mostly means a pair of good old-fashioned Mk I Eyeballs; in the Tesla's, it's radar, ultrasonics, and a suite of eight cameras enabling full-time 360-degree visual coverage.

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